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The Austrian Social Partnership .and Democracy 
1. Social Partnership:. Institutional Foundations 
Austria is a democratic, "Western-style" federal republic with about 7.8 million inhabitants. The 
president as head of state has a largely ceremonial position. Head of government is the prime minister, 
whose cabinet has to have the confidence of the federal parliament. At present four parties are 
:· . 
represented in parliament1 with the Social Democrats and the Conservatives forming a coalition 
government. 
What distinguishes Austria from other West-European political systems is the scope and influence of a 
cpecific form of "social partnership".2 In contrast to other countries, social partnership in Austria is not 
restricted to a system of labormanagement relations or of wage bargaining, but is a system of 
institutionalized cooperation between Jabor, business and government which is involved in all 
important aspects of economic and social policy. The Austrian social partnership was formed on a 
voluntary and informal basis by the Austrian Trade Union Federation and the Chambers of Agriculture, 
of Commerce, and of Labor to control post-war inflation in the early fifties. It then developed into a 
comprehensive system of influence in the fields of economic and social policy. 
The most important formal institution of social partnership is the "Parity Commission for Wages and 
Prices" as an instrument of macroeconomically oriented incomes policy. The Parity Commission was 
founded in 1957. Its members are the Chambers of Commerce, Labor and Agiculture, together with 
the Austrian Trade Union Federation (0GB) and the responsible ministers on a voluntary basis. 
Ahhough the Federal Chancellor acts a·s chairman, members of the government have no right to vote. 
All decisions have to be unanimous. The Parity Commision works on a voluntary basis and has no legal 
authority nor any means of applying direct sanctions. The threat to impose sanctions is left to the 
government, but has hardly ever been used. 
The Parity Commission is the top-level bargaining institution of incomes poficy in Austria; it was set up 
to control price and wage trends. Thanks to its tripartite structure, however, it has also become "an 
instrument which gives the employers· and workers· organizations a voice in government economic 
policy in general and, conversely, enables the Government to ensure of co-operation from these 
organizations in its economic-policy measures". (H. Suppanz, Robinson, 1972, p 17) 
1 Socialdemocrats: 80 seats, People's Party (Conservatives): 60, Freedom Party:33, ·Green Party•: 10. 
2 For descriptions of the system of social partnership and political-science and economic policy discussions in 
the English-language literature see H. Suppanz, D. Robinson (1972) J. Farnleitner E. Schmidt (1982), P. J. 
Katzenstein (1984), J. R. Freeman (1989). The institutional description in this papers follows A. Guger (1990). 
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The Parity Commission has formed sub-committees on prices and wages to handle its task of 
influencing prices and wages: the Prices Sub-Committee authorizes price increases which have to be 
justified by substantial cost increases and applied for individual firms or branches. In the late seventies, 
the Prices SubCommittee covered about 20% of consumer prices and about 50% of industrial prices; 
officially regulated prices and tariffs, which cover another 15% to 20% of consumer expenditures3, 
and import prices are included. Today, coverage is still lower and by and large confined to certain basic 
foods and energy. 
The Wages Sub-Committee exercises its control on wages by approving or refusing the opening of 
wage negotiations. Its task is to combine both wage-bargaining autonomy at the industry level and the 
introduction of macroeconomic considerations in the wage formation process. To start wage 
negotiations, individual trade unions have to apply through the Trade Union Federation. Thus 
although wage negotiations are conducted by the subordinate sectoral trade union bodies, the 
Federation has a voice in fixing the dates and co-ordinating individual wage claims. Although individual 
trade unions are autonomous in their actual wage negotiations, bargaining processes have to be 
authorized and are co-ordinated by the Trade Union Federation and the Wages Sub-Committee. 
A third permanent Sub-Committee is the Economic and Social Advisory Board, extending the activities 
of the Commission beyond incomes policies and broadening the scientific basis of economic policy. 
The Advisory Board is composed of representatives of the social partners and ministries as well as of 
experts from the Austrian Institute of Economic Research and universities. Its task is to study important 
economic and social questions and prepare a scientific basis for policy recommandations of the social 
partners to the Government. It is thus a kind of mixture between a ·council of Economic Advisers" and 
a negotiating body in specific social conflicts.4 
Besides the Parity Commission there is a huge network of advisory boards, committees, etc., were the 
social partners are represented. To give but a few examples: 
\- The Austrian Central Bank has an ownership structure, where only 50% of the shares are owned by 
the federal government, the rest of the shares is owned directly or indirectly by the big interest 
groups forming the system of social partnerships. These groups are thus also represented in the 
governing bodies of the Central Bank. This facilitates the coordination of monetary and incomes 
policy. 
- The social partners dominate the system of social security and have nomination rights for its central 
management positions. 
3 No'NOtny (1991) p. 138 
4 Thus e.g. the process of reducing the weekly working-time was prepared by common ·social partner· studies of 
this Advisory Board, whereas in Germany and other countries very similar results have been acchieved only after 
long and costly strikes. 
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- The social partners have a decisive role in the Council for Foreign Labor Policy, which decides about 
the number of foreign "guest-workers· admitted to Austria. 
- The social partners are represented in the decision making bodies of the special credit institutions for 
government guaranteed export credits or subsidized credits for industrial policy or R & D-
investments. 
. 
The basis of the system of social partnership in Austria are strong and comprehensive institutionafized 
interest groups. A specific aspect of these interest groups are the various "chambers", I. e. 
representatve bodies of diverse professional groups with (legally) compulsory membership. Such an 
official system of interest groups, which historically dates back to the medieval guilds, has survived on 
this scale only in Austria5. 
The chambers are empowered by law to represent the interest of their members in public affairs and in 
•. I 
contacts with public authorities. Thus, the chambers must be consulted by the government on 
economic and financial legislation and policy. The form of the chambers· organization, too, is stipulated 
by law. Common to all of them is a democratic structure, which requires all positions to be filled through 
elections. 
\ Austria's independent entrepreneurs are represented in the provincial and federal Chambers of 
Commerce with the federal central body being composed of six sections comprising industry, 
commerce, trade, transport, tourism; and finance, credit, and insurance. Representation is primarly 
organized at the provincial level, followed by a system of indirect elections for the appointment of 
officials at the federal level. 
The Chambers of Agriculture are base_d in the provinces, where all office holders are elected directly 
by farmers. Representation at the federal level is provided by a Presidential Conference. Chamber 
positions are filled through direct elections and activities are financed by compulsory membership 
fees . 
. Unfike the chambers, the Trade Union Federation is based on voluntary membership. It represents 
employees of private as well as public enterprises. The Federation has a total membership of about 
1,600,000 and is, in legal terms, a juridical person, while the unions it incorporates are not. Thus, while 
a union may negotiate a collective agreement, legally, the Federation as such must endorse it. 
Moreover, it is the federation that decides jurisdictional questions among unions, which are, in the 
l.__ main, organized on an industrial basis. The exception is the Private Employees·s Union. 
5 There are institutions similar to this in some of the German provinces ("Lander"') and in Luxembourg. For 
detained descriptions of the chambers and other labour market related institutions see various contributions in 
Sweeney, Weidenholzer (1988) and Farnlei1ner, Schmidt (1982) · 
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Based on voluntary membership is also the powerful "Federation of Austrian lndustriafists·. which in 
the context of social pamtership is in close cooperation with the Federal Economic Chamber. 
2. ~ Partnership i.a !he Context Qf 11w Austrian Pofiticat System, 
To understand the development and the role of the system of social partnership in Austria some 
specific charact_eri~tics of the Austrian political and economic system have to be borne in mind. Such 
-~ -- -- ---~-·---- -------
characteristics are: 
- Small Size of Economic Area: This implies heavy dependence on exports and fimited room for 
economic poficy action. In terms of economic policy decisions, the small size of the country entails a 
rather small number of_:~onomic policy makers who are in CC)~tinual contcicl with each other. 
- Historical and political development: Austria between the wars was a country characterized by latent 
and open civil war. In a rare example of learning from history after World War II, the !_<>'!Iler enemy parties 
formed a Grand Coalition of Social Democrats and Conservatives6. A sense of economic and social 
partnership arose in those days inspite of the still differing ideologies of the two camps. Rather 
unexpectedly, this new approach to economic and social cooperation gained in importance at the end 
of the Grand Coalition, as the economic interest groups affiliated with the parties had maintained sub-
stantial independence from "their" respective party and expanded cooperation in economic and social 
affairs as a leeway for consensus-oriented, continuous economic policy. Thus, the "risks" of a one-
party government could be mitigated for both the governing and the opposition parties. This, in turn, 
led to multiple "silent coalitions" which are reflected in personnel policies still oriented towards party 
affiliations, policies which are not _limited to the pubfic sector as such, but extend into the directly or 
indirectly nationalized companies. 
The coafition-governments after 1983 (first a coalition between Socialdemocrals and Freedom Party, 
since 1987 a coalition between Socialdemocrats and Conservatives) lead to a decline in the political 
impact of the system of social partnership. This was caused by structural effects, but also by an 
increased "autonomy" of the political sphere versus the systems of social partnership. Both aspects 
will be discussed later in sections 5 and 6. 
- Ownership: Both foreign capital and the public sector hold substantial interests in the Austrian 
economy 7. In recent years, there have been developments in the nationalized business sector which 
6 For a detailled analyses of Aust~ia's post war economic policy, see Rudolf Klier (1991} 
7 In 1978, there was the following ownership structure in Austrian business corporations in terms of proportional 
shareholdings: federal-government interest: 26%, provincial- and localgovernment: 10%, banks and savings 
institutions: 9%; private Austrian interests 25%, foreign holdings 30%. (Ederer/Goldmann/ 
Reitlechner/Reitzner/Wehsely, 1985). Since 1978, federal-government interests have decreased, foreign 
interests have increased. 
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impinge directly and indirectly upon the system of economic and social partnership: structural changes 
in basic industries and specific organizational and managerial problems have reduced the importance 
of the nationafized industry (the holding being known as "Austrian Industries", formerly OIAG) in the 
economy as a whole. In the light of these problems, the OIAG Act of 1986 provided for an exclusively 
commercial and business oriented approach to be pursued by the public business sector and, in 
1987, the sale of shares in public-sector companies began. This means that corporate goals such as 
job security and full employment now _rank distinctly lower in the nationalized industry, a development 
which may have repercussions on corporate behavior in other economic areas. 
Fewer employees in the traditionally highly organized labor force of the basic industries may imply a 
loss in the relative strength of the labor unions. Less willingness to pursue macroeconomic and public-
sector goals in price and employment policies and a potentially increasing influence of foreign owners, 
who are not integrated in the economic and social-partnership system, may encroach on the system's 
room for maneuvering. The favora~le economic development of the last years has helped toprevent 
any major practical impact of this trend. However, it is difficult to predict what this trend away from the 
system would mean in times of economic crises. 
a. Austria's ,S,Qci,a!.a!!Q Economic Development 
Austria's transformation from the poor country of the period between the World Wars to one of the. 
richest countries of the world - on per capita basis - is closely connected with- and largely caused by, 
-..--·-, - - . 
~Y~!~rri of social partnership. Starting from a low level of productivity, the post-war development of 
the Austrian economy has been a more or less continuous catching-up process. In 1979, Austria's 
GDP per capita was on average abqut 5% lower than in OECD - Europe and 20% lower than in 
Germany. In the seventies and early eighties however, Austria's economy improved its relative 
position significantly. In 1989, Austria's GDP per capita was about 10% higher than in OECD - Europe 
and 10% lower than Germany's. 
In the eighties, the development of the Austrian economy indicates a gradual abandonment of the 
policy of the seventies. While the hard currency approach (i.e. a fixed exchange-rate towards the 
------~------ ---·- . -
DM)and moderate incomes policies has been maintained, fiscal policy has been significantly less 
expansionary or even contractionary. The "consolidation" of the federal budget has taken precedence 
-over full employment, and the unemployment rate increased from 1.6% in 1980 to 6% in 1991.8 
8 Unemployment rates acx:ording to Austrian statistics. Taking CECO-Definitions the standardized 
unemployment rate is 3.5% (compared to an average total OECD unemployment rate of 6.8% for 1991) 
5 
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Still Austria's economic pertormance is above average realtive to OECD/ and EC/ standards (see Table 
1). Together with Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands Austria is a member of the group of 
European "hard currency-countries·. 
With economic integration with the economies of Western Europe9 rapidly increasing, Austria's 
economic developments are, of course, increasingly connected with the general economic trends of 
Europe. This impfies a reduction of the amount of economic independence - irrespective of Austria's 
--·-------. 
joining the EC (in the case of accession Austria would, however, be able to take part in the EC 
decision-making process) . 
. 
This general tendency of increased international economic interdependence does not mean, 
however, that national economic and social policies become irrelevant. There is still a wide range of 
policies where economic policy does matter, and thus also the special institutional national 
arrangements, such as the Austrian system of social partneship: Such policy fields are, for instance, 
the structure of tIDCes and subsidies, policies concerning research, and structural change and wage 
and price developments in the "sheltered", not internationally exposed sector of the economy. 
A cha~~cteristic feature of the Austrian systems of social partnership is the consensus of all its 
------· 
participants on the priority of economic growth and full employment. There are no explicit targets 
COn£erning income distribution or redistribution. Implicitly, by_!y}_11g wage increases to productivity 
_g!owth,Jhe trade unions accept a constant functional distribution of income.10 Since the seventies 
trade union leaders and the politicians of the labor movement have emphasized consistently that 
maintaining full employment is the most effective distributive policy. The priority on employment goals 
is also reflected in the fact that despite the corporatist institutional setting, which has often been . 
considered an obstacle to flexible market adjustments, nominal and real wage flexibility in Austria is 
relatively high by international standards. Econometric wage equattions show that Austria is one of the 
few countries where the Phillips relation still holds. The unemployment elasticity of nominal wages 
comes close to that of Japan and has been one of the highest in the OECD countries. Since price 
increases have not been fully compensated and nominal wages react flexibly to changes in 
unemployment also real flexibility has been high (Guger, 1991, pp 14). "!"his employment- and 
productivity-oriented wage policy is made possible by a centralized structure of trade-unions and 
employers· associations and the strong institutionalized position of the interest groups (see section 
4). This is also reflected in the low strike rate in Austria 11 , which has to be considered not as a sign of 
weakness, but of strength of the trade unions and a functioning national consensus on priorities. 
9 Austria's export-ratio of GNP amounts to 42%. About 65% of exports go to the EC. About 11% to EFTA and 
about 8% to former COMECON countries. 
10 The wage ratio (adjusted for changes in employment structures) of national income oscillated about 65% since 
the sixties • with a tendency to decline last year. The unadjusted wage share increased from 59.9% in 1960 to 
70.7% in 1990. For a general discussion, see Flanagan, Sokica, Ulman(1983), G. Tichy (1984). 
11 1989: Strike-minutes per worker: 0.5 (US .. 67.6). (ILO Yearbook 1989/90). More than 60% of the strikes in 
Austria took place in the public sector, where aspects of productivity growth and international competition 
naturally play a minor role. 
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Table 1: AUSTRIA'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Growth-rate 
1991 {forecast}: 
Austria 
CECO-average_ ' 
EC-average (EC 12) 
1990: 
Austria 
CECO-average 
EC-average (EC 12) 
EC-average (EC 9} 
1980 
-
1990: 
Austria 
CECO-average 
EC-average {EC 12) 
EC-average (EC 9) 
{1) % of total labour force 
Source: WIFO (Austria), OECD 
3,0% 
1,1% 
1,5% 
4,9% 
2,3% 
2,8% 
2,7% 
2,2% 
2,9% 
2,3% 
2,1% 
Inflation-rate 
3,3% 
6,0% 
5,3% 
3,3% 
6,3% 
5,7% 
3,5% 
6,0% 
6,7% 
7 
Unemployment-
rate (1) 
5,3% 
7,1% 
9,0% 
4,7% 
6,2% 
8,4% 
3,8% 
7,3% 
9,4% 
4. ~ Jheoretica) Aspects 
There are various theoretical approaches that are relevant for analysing and discussing the structure 
and effects of the system of social partnership in Austria. Some of the most important of these 
theoretical aspects are discussed below.12 
- Austria as an example of advanced corporatist structures: 
The point of departure of discussions about Austrian "corporatism" - discussions which are carried on 
intensively and primarily by political scientists - is the question of political and economic decision-
i:naking processes. A model of pluralistic and market controlled systems (e.g. that of the U.S.) is 
contrasted with a model of corporatist systems where large organized interest-groups do not only act 
as competitors for influence on politics and administration, but are also included in governmental 
decision making and, to a degree, in administrative processes. 
Some of the main elements of corporatism, such as powerful, centralized trade unions and nation-wide 
bargaining systems, used to be criticized by "free-market 
economists" as monopolistic elements and, hence, impediments to the smooth functioning of 
competitve markets. But since in recent years a _ r:iumber of studies seem to indicate that such 
corpora_tist features foster smooth real-wage adjustments, corporatist institutions have been 
discussed more and more as a possible instrument to improve labor-market performance (Katzenstein 
1984, Freeman, Calmfors/Drifill 1988, Guger 1990). 
The Austrian system of social partnership is of special interest in that, on the one hand, it has given rise 
to marked corporatist structures and, on the other, it represents an example of an "authoritarian 
corporatism" ("state corporatism," "corporatist state") developing into a neo-liberal corporatism ("social 
corporatism") (Talas, 1985,p.27). 
Especially from a Keynesian perspective, tll_~ ~f!~cts of corporatist institutions go beyond the labor " 
, market. Industrial relations shape the expectations of private investment and growth. The 
consequences of free bargaining at high-employment levels under adverse political-institutional 
conditions have been demonstrated by Britain's "stop-and-go policy" in the post-war period and its 
harmful effects on business expectations, investment and growth. 
The KeY.nesian position is best summed up by Kalecki's conclusion (1943): 
12 For further discussion, see Calmfors, Drifill (1988), A. Guger (1991), E. Nowotny (1991 ), B. Rowthorn (1991 ). A 
general institution-oriented approach is presented in E. Matzner, W. Streeck 1991. 
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·Full employment capitalism will have .. .to develop new social and political institutions which 
will reflect the increased power of the working class. If capitalism can adjust itself to full 
employment, a fundamental reform will have been incorporated in it•. If not, it will show itsett 
an outmoded system which must be scrapped." 
If corporatist arrangements can be see~ as such new social and political institutions which facilitate the 
pursuit of long-run full employment strategies, some form of corporatism may prove a (necessary) 
precondition for maintaining a combination of price stability and full employment in the long run, at 
least in societies with a strong labor movement. 
Public Choice 
Central to modem theories of economic policy and public finance is the attempt to explain economic-
policy decisions endogenously on the basis of the economic agents' economic interests, with these 
interests being viewed against the backdrop of the neoclassical paradigm of individual utility 
maximization 13. Pivotal is also the analysis of the behavior of interest groups, trade associations and 
political parties who act as competitive "suppliers" in a system of party competition. Certain groups of 
voters can enforce their demands by other means than simply the election mechanism on the "political 
market", viz., by organizing into interest groups and thus obtaining additional clout. 
In· such cases, the market mechanism may be superseded by direct bargaining between the groups or 
between interest groups and the public sector (e.g. influencing tax laws, subsidies). The ability to 
organize of the various groups is the greater the greater the homogeneity of their economic interests 
is. Their political clout is in connection with to their potential economic threat, e.g. investment freeze, 
strikes, refusal to donate to parties. 
Their organizational ability and their economic might will determine the main thrust of the activities and 
the lobbying power of the various interest groups. It is argued, for example, that the system of 
economic and social partnership in Austria is basically organized to benefit the supply side (employers' 
associations, labor unions), with the interests of the consumers, the ecologists, and the economically 
non-active being perfunctorily attended to by these producer-oriented associations. To actually 
enforce their interests such "minorities" depend largely on direct political processes (elections). This 
may trigger conflicts between the political agents (parties) and the (primarily economic) interest groups 
or between bargaining processes within the system of economic and social partnership and political 
decision making. 
13 For a survey of these approaches see Nowotny (1990, p.54ff .) 
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An important issue in public choice theory is the conditions for, and the degree of, agreement 
between special-interest groups and macroeconomic goals. It has been shown that macroeconomic 
inefficiencies arise more frequently if ·distribution coalitions· (M. Olson, 1982) are narrow-based and 
regional or sector-specific in nature. All-inclusive interest groups such as those typical of Austria's 
economic and social partnership suggest higher macroeconomic efficiency than would result from the 
actions of smaller specific interest groups (lobbies), which are not in the position to take proper 
account of any macroeconomic repercussions of their actions 14. 
Separation and Coordination Models in Economic Policy 
Assessment of the effectiveness and necessity of macroeconomic coordination mechanisms like the 
system of economic and social partnershipin Austria is essentially determined by the underlying 
assumptions about relevant macroeconomic interdependencies, although it must be admitted that 
there is a plurality of views on these assumptions in current economic theory. Central is the question to 
what extent there is a need-for macroeconomic coordination between important areas of economic 
policy and, thus, to what extent there is mutual influencing and interaction among the various agents, 
which, after all, is a cornerstone of economic and social cooperation. One particular concern is 
coordination of employment, stabilization and growth policies or - from an institutional point of view -
coordination of monetary, fiscal and incomes policies. 
From the viewpoint of ·new classical macroeconomics· or ·supplyside economics· there is no such 
need for coordination or only to a very limited degree. This results in a ·separation model" which, 
under the wage-influence of the German Bundesbank, bears substantially on the economic-policy 
discussion in the EC and the OECD. This separation model comprises distinctive emphasis areas: 
responsibility for employment is assigned to incomes policy and, thus, to the bargaining parties. In this 
model, monetary policy is limited more or less to ensuring price stability. The govemmant sector has 
no, or rather limited, opportunities (and responsibilities) in stabilization and employment policies. The 
pubfic sector's function is primarily statically, but also dynamically, allocative (e.g. technology policy). 
The model's mainthrust is, essentially, that there is no responsibility and no real need for coordination 
in employment policy for government and central bank. 
From a post-Keynesian perspective, the simultaneous attainment of full employment and price stability 
is not possible without comprehensive economic-policy coordination. The assumption involved is that 
economic development is a result of a variety of exogenous shocks, changing expectations, etc .. 
Economic policy is consequently charged with countervailing any instabilities (this task being 
complicated by the internationalization of businesses and economies). In the event of 
underemployment of resour~es in an economy (above all unemployment of tabor), specific and 
14 I~ ~his regard, Olson (1982, p.92) sees Austria as a positive example in contrast to ·partial" distribution 
coahllons. 
l 0 
concerted monetary and fiscal policy action is required; in the event of full employment or 
overemployment of resources, incomes policy plays a crucial role. Even if monetary and fiscal poficies 
achieve a level of aggregate demand that ensures full employment, the problem arises that the 
stronger bargaining position of suppliers of goods and labor leads to higher prices, which, in tum, may 
necessitate restrictive macroeconomic demand-side policies. Of particular concern are exogenous 
supply shocks (e.g. increasing key-resource prices): if economic policy tries to counterbalance this 
supply shock by lowering aggregate demand, lags in accommodation may cause stagflation. 
Stagflation is normally a transitional phenomenon - as recent experiences in the world economy show -
but it may be protracted and painful. 
1 1 
In both scenarios outlined above, incomes policy plays a crucial part in finding a way to achieve price-
level stabifity and employment at the same time. In any case, stabilization crises with the enormous 
social cost and the risk of overshooting they entail are to be avoided. The specific objectives of any 
such incomes policy and its finetuni:ig depend on the surrounding macroeconomic circumstances. In 
the first ("full-employment") case, ex ante regulation will be used to avoid inflationary distribution wars 
(which, on balance, corresponds to productivity oriented wage and price policy if a constant functional 
incomes distribution is accepted). In the "cost-push" or "supply shock" case, accommodation to new 
relative price conditions is subject to social consensus to prevent accellerating cost-push-inflation. In 
either case, it is important to see that ther~Js, alvv-ays .~ need for close coordination and interaction of,. 
inco!!les-, monetary- andfiscal~PO..!ifi~s if the dual objectives of fuUemployment and.prjce.-l~vel stability 
'-- ·-·-------·-•~'-•---•-·--,.,..... . . ., ---~---·· . ---- t 
are to_ be achieved simultaneously. 
A thorough theoretical evalution of the· approaches outlined here is not possible for reasons of time 
and space. A clear empirical analysis is just as difficult. Yet, it may be concluded tha!_go"._'_l:.niments who 
tend to pursue a "coordination approach" (e.g. Austria's) are more likely to combine the ojective of full 
~------- ... ··- . -··- .. .. . •-. - . 
employment with the objective of price.stability (Guger, 1990), while go~9.mments who tend to steer a 
"separation course" are inclined to put up with higher natural unemployment to secure price stability. 
However, certain bilateral and reciprocal patterns must be observed in the process. A11Y ... CO.Q!'Qination 
st~ategy presupposes effective economic agents, in particular economic interest groups able to act at 
-- . - . ··., -
the macroeconomic level. If this prerequisite is not met - as is often the case in Anglo-Saxon countries -
_ such strategies do not work. The weaker, for example, incomes-policy agents are, the slimmer the 
:., - . . - . - . 
chances for any coordination strategy to succeed, whereas, conversely, a systen, of incomes policy 
__ ~~~It ~~n strong interest groups suggests more opportunities for achieving the dual goals of full 
-~-mp!oyment and price stability. This illustrates that general appraisals of economic-policy control 
systems such as Austria's economic and social partnership and any recommendations on their 
international transferability must be made very prudently and carefully, bearing in mind the respective 
--~·. 
economy's institutional bases. 
- Economic stabifity as a pubfic good 
\ The most sensitive field for a coordination strategy of economic poficy is the field of incomes poficy. 
The problems and downright failure of macroeconomic incomes policy help monetarists, for example, 
to justify their postulate of ·enforcing· indispensable stability-oriented behavior through one-sided 
targets (e.g. monetary targets}, even if this causes massive cost in the real sector. In fact, such poficy 
concepts have proven to be rather costly in macroeconomic terms and not efficient, at least 
macroeconomically 15. 
If it is assumed that essential objectives of economic policy cannot be achieved efficiently without 
allowing for macroeconomic incomes policy, this means that, ~!~ng with government and central bank, 
t!!_e economic and social partners should participate In macroeconomic decision making, too. 
Participation, however, cannot be limited to moral suasion, but, much rather, necessitates assuming 
actual economic-policy responsibility and creating real, institutionalized opportunities for social 
partners to influence economic policy making. From the perspective of labor unions, integration into 
the macroeconomically oriented stability policy is only possible in the long run if integration and 
cooperation take place within the scope of policy participation beyond the plant level, i.e. participation 
which involves more than wages and working conditions. 
Labor unions deem expansion of existing participation to be primarily necessary because this would 
help them overcome their relatively weaker bargaining power which is due to the fact that wages - in 
contrast to prices - are contractually agreed. If it possible, however, _to expand the contract-based 
sectors, or, in a wider sense; the bargaining-oriented sectors of the economy, the labor unions' 
opportunities to co-determine real-wages will increase, at the same time the risk of having to make 
advance concessions in stabilization policies is lower. Psychologically important is also the fact that 
expanding the scope of cooperation beyond wage policy and, thus expanding the number of 
negotiating areas, increases the chance to reach compromises considerably. 
Fundamental to the problems discussed above is the fact that economic stability has the 
characteristics_ (in the terminology of the theory of public finance} of a pure public good. This implies 
that economic stability is a condition of the economy_ which benefits all participants, even though not all 
of them may have contributed to its existence. This again means that - from an isolated and individual 
perspective - it is rational for every participant in the system to demand stabilityoriented behavior from 
all the other participants, without complying oneself. This_free-rider effect is often reflected in the 
__r:elationships between local or regional governments, between fiscal and monetary policies. Incentives 
to employ such behavioral strategies will prevail among •small· economic agents, i.e. agents who 
15 From the standpoint of spe~ific social and political interests, the picture may be varied. Thus, the 
achievements of the ostentatiously non-cooperative style of the Thatcher Government lend themselves to rather 
ambivalent interpretation from a comprehensive economic perspective, although that policy has, to a high 
degree, achieved its original goal, viz., the 
reduction of the degree of organization and the influence of the (often just as non-cooperative) trade unions. 
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reckon that their nonconforming conduct will remain undetected or, if detected, will not attract 
negative feedback from the other participants in the system. This is particularly true for the price policy 
of any individual firm, but also for the wage poficy of any single labor union. 
In areas which correspond to the common description of public goods, a strategy of "internafization·, 
i.e. centrafization and direct allocation of responsibirity and decision making, is necessary to reach an 
agreement which is rational from bot~ the individual and the social perspectives. Austria's economic 
and social partnership can be viewed as a system which, given the political autonomy of the economic 
agents, makes allowance for the fact that 3.-_cf ecentralized system of individual decision-ma~ers is not 
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able !O __ c1_dequately provide pure public goods such as price stability or fair incomes distribution, even 0 
" more so if checks and balances and control instruments like price competition are not working or not 
working effectively. 
If centralization in terms of regula\ions imposed by central government is not desirable and/or not 
enforceable, the need arises for internalization by heavily centralized and powerful economic interest 
groups, with the power and authority of such interest groups surviving in the long run only if they are 
based on broad internal, democratically confirmed consensus. The consequential reduction of the 
number of major participants in the economic system means that, in contrast to unsanctioned free 
riding, the provision of a public good must be bargained for, with the small number of participants 
implying the possibility of sanctions against free riders. 
The system of economic and social partnership thus appears to be a suitable instrument of stability and 
jncome~_policies, because it is based on a high degree of centralization, with this centralization 
1 -~~pporting opportunities to enforce internal discipline in the interest-groups. As a variety of sectors is 
included, the system shows to the various participants the macroeconomic interrelations and 
interdependencies of their actions, in particular as regards the interaction of price and wage policies, 
but also impacts on and from international trade and fiscal and monetary poITcies. 
Another general conclusion which may be derived from the functioning of the Austrian system of 
economic and social partnership is that any price and incomes policy is only successful if it is based on 
voluntary cooperation between powerful economic-interest groups and. is not subject to any 
gover:i:imental pressure or coercion. In a present-day parliamentarian democracy it is obviously very 
difficult for any government to get involved in a power struggle in price and incomes policy between 
employers' or employees' organizations without losing face and common ground with the interest 
groups._ However, it is possible for a government to be included in a comprehensive bargaining system 
. as an "equal partne'r'·, thus influencing •social-partnership strongholds· like price and incomes policy in 
coordination with fiscal and international-trade instruments. 
s. SQm.e Specific Democracy Aspects 01 the Austrian System oJ SQcial Partnership, 
Whereas the Austrian system of social partnership is usually perceived very positively by economists, 
its evaluation by pofitical scientists tends to be more cautious and sceptical16 • This critisim is mainly 
centered on the fear (and/or observation) of "der11~cracy~deficits" of a corporatist social partnership, 
Austrian style. Such "democracy-deficits" may occur with regard to the general political power 
structure and with regard to the internal decision-making procedures of the interest groups forming 
. ~- . 
the system of social partnership. 
In terms of power sharing in a democratic country, an encompassing system of social partnership 
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1. means, in effect, that the interest groups represented in the system of SQ_C,i?I partnership obtain direct "'J 
: _· influence and responsibility in a number of central fields of economic. and soda I policy. In extreme ., 
cases, this may lead to a situation, where effective political decisions are made between the social 
partners and parliament has only the function of "ratifying" their decisions. Such a tendency is, of 
course, most fikely in a constellation of a "big coalition" between the two leading parties, each of which 
is closely linked to one side of the social partnership. 
And. in fact, there are several fields of policy, as for instance r_egulations of working conditions 
(including the regulation of working and closing hours), the social-security system, the ~9mission of 
foreign workers and - partly - the structure of tax reforms, where the decision making process has been 
delegated to negotiations between the "social partners" and the results of these negotiations were 
then enacted by parliament (where many officials of social partnership organization serve as 
members). Such a tendency of "delegation of power" is increased by the fact that the Austrian 
.e_a_rfiar11ent as such has only a very limited professional staff so that the political parties to a large extent 
have t.o rely on the expertise of the organizations of the social partners. On the other hand the 
Austrian system of social partnership also has the effect that lobbies and small special-interest groups 
only play a minor role in the parliamentarian process in Austria, because these interest groups are 
"internalized" by the umbrella organization of the social partners. 
Apart from issues in constitutional law and democratic theory, the strong position of the system of 
social partnership in the law making process also poses political problems, because the interest 
groups forming this system, although being encompassing, do not represent the totality of the 
population. This holds true both with regard to economic and political aspects. Basically, social 
partnership, Austrian style, is a "growth and stabilization-oriented" coalition of interest groups repre-
senting the production side of the economy. Social groups and problemareas that are not central to 
this "growth coalition" are iri danger of a policy of "benign neglect". This holds, for instance, for 
housewives and other groups not directly integrated into (wage-oriented) production processes, also 
16 See e.g.: F. Scharpf (1984), D. Cameron (1984), B. Gerlich, E. Grande. W.Muller (1985), P. Katzenstein) 
1984, pp 133) 
- to a lesser degree - for retired workers, Concerning activity areas of politics, income and employment 
aspects tend to recive more interest than ecological perspectives or issues of consumer protection. 
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Problems of "selective r~presentation" may also arise the other way round. Social partnership means \ ''> 
--------~------------··---- - - . _,_ ----. . -
~j','_a_g~_c!!!d ~rice dis_cipH_n~. Groups that do not take part in the consensus-finding process of the 
system of social partnership may get a free-ride, by increasing their nominal income above average, 
whilst, at the same time, profiting !rom the low inflation rate secured by the system of social 
partnership. As long as these groups are small enough for the system to "get away• without 
inflationary reactions by other economic groups such a free-rider strategy will be successful. This 
applie~. for ynstance, to the "liberal and lea'"!led professions· like medical doctors and attorneys, which 
are by force of law organized in "chambers", but do not take part in the system of social partnership. 
These self-governing chambers issu!;l binding schedules of fees that have the economic effect of 
cartelized price lists. And, in fact, it can be shown that the incomes of these "non-cooperting"groups 
have increased much more rapidly than the incomes of the groups cooperating within the system of 
.. 
social partnership. 
From the political perspective the participants of the system of social partnership are closely 
connected with specific political groups: _trade unions are closely connected with the Social 
Democrats, Employers· associations are closely connected with the "buisness and the agricultural 
~ ··;rms;~f t~i C~~servative Parti1"7):This connection is so close that, in fact, large fields of economic 
"- ~-----· - ··- . 
and social policy ( e. g. tax policy, social security) are "delegated" to the "corresponding" interest 
groups by the parties. Negotiations· on such issues are executed by representatives of the social-
partnership interest groups, who act· "for" the political parties and usually are also members of 
parliament or even of the cabinet appointed by and for the political parties.18 This system means that 
_1/_ci~ous politica! groups are excluded from decision making in important fields, e. g. politicians of the 
two big parties who are not affiliated Vv'.ith one of the big interest groups. This is relevant, for instance, 
for the· employees organization of the Conservative Party, because in economic-policy negotiations, 
the Conservative Party has the exclusive role as an "umbrella" for organized business and agricultural 
interests. The same applies to farmers or enterpreneurs Within the Socialdemocratic Party. 
Exclusion is even more of a problem for parties with no direct affiliation to the system of social 
partnership, such as the Freedom Party and the Green Parties. The latter parties are, therefore, very 
critical of the system of social partnership and its political influence. It has to be noted that the problem 
of "exclusion", respectively exclusivity, does not refer to all fields of politics. There are, as a matter of 
fact, "spheres" dominated by the system of social partnership and other political fields, such as 
17 The Conservative Party consists of three autonomous "federations· representing entrepreneurs, agricutture 
and employees (mainly public servants). · 
18 The negotiations about the last, far reaching tax reform in Austria were the first where the chairman of .the 
parliamentarian finance committee (the author of this paper by the way) took part as a member of the small - and 
thus really decisive - negotiating committee. Previously, major changes of the tax code were negotiated between 
the minister of finance and representatives of the social partners and then pushed through parliamentary 
proceedures without major changes and further consultations. 
education, foreign policy, civil law etc., where decision making rests "directly" with the political parties 
and parliamentary negotiations. Also it has to be noted, that this structure holds, to its full extent, only 
in constellations where either one of the big parties has an absolute majority in parliament or where 
there is a coalition government between the two big parties. In a constellation of a "small coalition·, 
such as a coalition between the Socialdemocrats and the Freedom Party political processes tend to 
become very difficult, because in "social partnership areas· now a "dual consensus" between the 
social partners and between the partners of the coalition government is needed. This complex 
situtation may explain why, since Worl War II, there has been only one example of such a "small 
coafition", which was not very effective. 
Apart from democracy aspects on the national level, another interesting point is the democratic 
structures within the organizations of the social-partnership system. As far as the "chambers" are 
concerned each of them Is based on a special law, regulating the organization, financing and election 
proceedures. All of the "chambers" are organized on a provincial basis and have a central body on the 
federal level consisting of representatives of the provincial chambers. Elections are held on the basis 
of a direct vote of the members of the different chambers along party lines. According to the political 
structure shown above the chambers of agriculture and of commerce have always been dominated by 
the Conservative Party, In the chamber of labor the Socialdemocrats have an absolute majority in the 
chamber diet, the top governing body 19 Where one group has been ruling with absolute majority for 
a very long time problems with autocratic behaviour and insufficient public control may result. This has 
caused disussions about a reform of the legal structure of the chambers. New laws for the different 
chambers will bring a stronger position for the minority groups, stricter control and will bring the 
chambers under the jurisdiction of the independent "General Accounting Office·. 
Whereas the chambers are public-law entities, the Austrian Trade Union is a association incorporated 
under private law with voluntary membership. About 60% of all employees are members of the Trade 
Union. In international comparisons, this is a high degree of organization20_ The Austrian Federation of 
-~"" 
Trade Unions is divided into 15 specialized unions, basically organized along industry lines, one 
exception to this organizational principle being the Union of Private Employees. The Federation of 
Trade Unions is rarely directly involved in wage bargaining and concluding collective agreements (e.g. 
the Universal Collective Agreement on the introduction of a 40-hour working week). Wage bargaining 
i_s done by the individual unions in the name of the Federation with certain sub-organizations of the 
Federal Chamber of Commerce. 
In contrast to other countries (and to the inter-war situation) !!Jere exists only one trade union 
~r_!;lanization for each individual Industry. The dominant fraction is the Social Democratic group, only_ 
19 !" !he two west~r~mos~. alpine p~ovinces of Austria the employee-wing of the Conservative Party is the 
ma':'rr.y group. Thrs 15 mainly duet~ the fact, that in the provinces economically based on small businesses and 
tounsm, - ma,y employees are family members of the owners and tend to v I f Co 1-20 f · T d • o e or nserva ,ves. By way o comparison: ra e unron members as a perc t f labo f · · 
43%, Italy 33%, France 23%, Denmark 70%, Sweden85%. en age o r orce: Germany: 45%, Great Britain 
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the trade union of the civil servants has a Conservative majority. The executive boards of the industrial 
trade unions are elected at congresses of shop stewards, who themselves are elected directly on the 
plant level. The federal executive board is elected at a federal convention by delegates from the 
various industrial unions. At the federal trade union congress of 1991 l this election was the first time 
held by secret ballot; previously the election was de facto the acclamation of a board, selected by the 
chairmen of the biggest trade unions, considering also specific "minority rights· (one of the vice 
presidents has to be a woman, one ha~ to belong to the minority (=Conservative-party) group). 
The fact that ~~_']__!he "fre~" organizat~(?_ns ~ave a high degree_of orgc!_niz~tion, that they are directly 
and closely connected to one or another of the political parties, and that they are heavily centralized in 
terms of practical economic-poficy attitude is fundamental to understanding the institutional setting of 
Austrian economic policy. This applies, in particular to the Federation of Austrian Industrialists and for 
the relationship of the 15 specialized trade unions with the Federation of Trade Union, with the latter 
being the only body having corporate status, the individual unions being unincorporated associations. 
As "headquarters," the Federation of Trade Unions has sole authority over financial and personnel-
related matters. The broad spectrum of members in all sectors of the economy and the relatively strong 
position of the leadership of the unions facilitate its gatekeeper function even within- the individual 
unions, i.e., the internal coordination of differing standpoints. 
The last years have brought about substantial changes in the democratic structure and the political 
power of the system of social partnership. Within the organizations of the social partnership, 
institutional reforms have been taking place, aiming at more openess and more direct control by the 
members and the public. Changes have taken place also with regard to the attitudes of the members. 
In the chambers of commerce there are groups of new entrepreneurs who are increasingly unwilling to 
adhere to "group discipline". In the labor-oriented organizations, the number of independent or 
"Green" members and shop-stewards i~ increasing who are critical of the close ties with the big political 
parties. The right-wing Freedom Party has embarked on a campaign against obligatory membership in 
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the chambers. ~ithout obligatory membership, the chambers would, in effect, be reduced 
substantially in their organizational and financial structure and would thus be unable to play the · W 
,J macroeconomic role they are playing now. Thus the whole system of social partnership would be 
substantially cut down. The campaingn against obligatory membership did not meet with substantial 
public support, but it put the chambers in a rather defensive position and paved the way for internal 
reforms discussed above. 
One basic and politically inspired objection has always been against the trend towards centralizing 
economic policy making which is inherent in the system of economic and social partnership. The 
specific interests of the leaderships of the various organizations may imply that certain problem areas 
where they see little opportunity for gaining influence are left out of consideration in practical 
economic policy. One such area would be, for example, ~o~er participation, which ranks lower ol)_Jhe 
_Austrian Federation of Trade Union's list of priorities than, say, on the German's. The same holds for 
the regulation of working conditions or for the problem of participation of capital formation, where 
centrafized solutions (like the Swedish wage earner·s funds) do not meet with the employers' consent, 
while decentralized solutions cannot rely on support by the trade unions. 
Labor movement politicians also have often shown concern over the fact that conflict solving patterns 
on a central level isolated from •direct factory life· may weaken the readiness of the workforce for 
industrial action, especially strikes and thus may weaken the ·potential threai- of the central trade 
union body. In addition, it is pointed out that the intensive cooperation of (central} employees' 
organizations in various bodies above the plant level does not necessarily involve a strengthening of 
employees' interests, but could, conversely, entail reciprocal ·codetermination· where it is the various 
bodies and organizations themselves that influence the representatives of the interest groups and 
their poficies. In extreme cases, Interest-group representatives would no longer stand for the interests 
of their respective organization but for the institutional interests of individual important bodies21 • 
A detailed empirical assessment of the various objections raised against the system of social 
partnership is not possible in this paper, but it should be pointed out that the high degree of 
1 centralized relations between the economic and social partners has created on~ ess~ntial prerequisite 
for an economic policy efficient in terms of the economy as a whol_e. Weighing the pros of greater 
effectiveness of economic-policy making with the cons of centralization will, in the final analysis, result 
in normative judgments. It is, at any rate, important to consider the fact that there are sectors where 
decentralized decision making causes externalities, the result being tradeoffs between either higher 
efficiency in achieving macroeconomic goals or more corporate autonomy or worker participation. 
In general pofitics, the influence of the system of social partnership and of its organizations has been 
decfining over the last years. This is due mainly to three developments: 
- The political weight of groups and interests that are not (directly) represented or integrated in the 
system of social partnership has substantially increased. This holds especially for ecological 
questions and the Green Party, which since 1986 has been represented in the federal parliament. 
Ecological problems are deamed to be a top priority by Austrian voters. In situations where the 
priorities of the "growth-oriented· system of social partnership collide with ecological priorities, the 
mass media usually enthu~iastically side with ecologists and ecological priorities will win. This was 
the case, for instance, in a referendum on atomic power plants. Although all institutions forming the 
system of social partnership (and also the government) advocated the installation of a nuclear power 
plant in Austria, this proposition was turned down in a referendum with the· effect that nuclear power 
plants are now forbidden in Austria. A similar situation resulted with regard to a hydroelectric power 
plant planned in a region which was later declared a national park. These - and similar - events show 
that increasing groups of _the population ~end to value safety and environmental interests higher 
than employment and income interests. This has to be seen against the background of an 
21 b the theory cl economic regulalion this problem is discussed th bi f • • 
as e pro em o capturing· the regulators. 
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economic situation in Austria that is characterized by low unemployment and substantial increases in 
real incomes. It is thus an illustration of the situation, which Josef Schumpeter (1942) discussed in 
"Socialism, Capitalism and Democracy", where the success of a social system undermines its very 
foundations because this success leads to new problems and aspirations. 
. -
In reaction to this trend, which is especially strong in the German speaking countries of Europe, the 
big political parties became more ecologically minded. Thus they have managed to regain their 
political power base and to roll back the "Green parties", who were not be able to offer convincing 
economic-policy alternatives. It also meant that the strong influence of the "production-oriented" 
interest groups on the political partje~ declined and the political parties increasingly "emancipate" 
themselves from that groups. 
- In connection with the developments described above, ongoing changes in the structure of voters 
and party members are to be observed . The traditional blocks of solid socio-economic groups loyal 
,;, to a specific party ~!~~ers, blue-collar w?rkers, small shop owners) are declining. Voter attitudes are 
to a lesser degree organized along clear, economic lines. Thus the social partnership organizations 
representing these interests are losing influence within "their" respective parties. Thus, the 
willingness of the parties to delegate central issues of politics to the system of social partnership is 
declining. Like many other countries, Austria is entering an area of "post-modernist" politics, where 
simple _and stable partyJoyalities_,_decline and the numbers of independent voters increase. This 
'- - ···-·. -·--··-·-·-~-·--· . . . . . 
tendency will be strengthened by a proposed change of the system of elections, giving more 
weight to individual candidates against party lists of candidates 
- As a small open economy, Austri.a has rapidly increased its economic (and also cultural) 
--·-· 
intemationafization. This means an increased role of external influences that cannot be controlled 
w! 
, by_ internal_(A~strian) policies and thus also not by the system of social partnership. The trend 
towards internationalization would, of course, further accelerate in the case of Austria joining the EC 
(see section 6}. Also the developments in Eastern Europe pose new problems for the social-
partnership system. A wave of i111migrant \Yorkers from poor Eastern countries to neighboring 
Austria increases the supply of cheap labor and th_us _ tends to weaken the position of Austrian 
workers on the labor market (especially of less qualified ones). This has led the trade-unions to 
advocate a restrictive policy towards immigration from the East, whereas business (and parts of the 
public opinion} demand a liberal labor market policy. Given the geographical and political situation of 
Austria it has to be expected ( and this is already occurring) that the legal or illegal influx of foreign 
workers will increase substantially. This will weaken especially the blue collar trade unions and may 
iri!!_~ence the delicate balance of the ~ustrian system of social partnership. 
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6. Eu1u.r.e Perspectives fQI ttm System Qf ~ Partnership 
Issues crucial to the future of the economic and social partnership result from the following interrelated 
questions: 
- the prospective development and power of the organizations involved in the system, 
- the development of the surrounding macroeconomic circumstances affecting the Austrian economy, 
- changes in social and political structures and values. 
As mentioned before, the power of the system of economic and social partnership to shape its future 
depends on the power and the internal cohesion of the economic interest groups supporting the 
system. Changes in the structure of production - decrease in basic industries, increase in services -
and in p~Q.d_LJction methods ("flexible specialization instead of mass production," Sabel, 1982} tend to 
boost the importance of small and mediumscale enterprises. Both the employers' and the employees' 
organizations ~~ce the problem that such enterprises are more diffi-cult to integrate in their interest 
groues and_ t~ subject to macroeconomic discipline. The groups concerned might thus be 
encouraged to act as soci~I_Jr~~ ~d._E!_r~. a behavior pattern that is already characteristic of some of the 
learned and liberal professions. Above-average increases in income achieved by such strategies may, 
however, jeopardize consensus in the Parity Commission. 
The ~p_eed_ofjnnoyation, the rapid progress of structural change and ~_r,sequential changes in quality 
requirements and traini[tg patterns necessitate and facilitate more flexibility on the labor markets. 
---·-·- --.- -~·· - ---, ~--~ - . . . ' . 
Collective contractual obligations as provided by the system of economic and social partnership are 
getting more difficult to achieve. On the part of the employees, "headquarters'" authority may be 
weakened by minor groups who possess great "potential for interference" by occupying technological 
key positions and who, due to educational and sociologi-cal background, may be less willing to show 
solidarity on a "supra~professional" or "supra-occupational" level than traditional trade union members. 
22 This, combined with a greater diversity of private life-styles, may be indicative of a trend towards 
"going it alone" with its obviously negative impact on the unity and the bargaining power of large 
interest groups. 
At the very least, this trend means the necessity to shift responsibilities within the interest groups from 
headquarters to the plant level (e.g. as regards working hours and work patterns}. Greater diversity of 
employer and employee interests also implies that the number of "outsiders" will increase, who have or 
perceive no interest in a comprehensive system of interest groups involving compulsory membership. 
However, it is this system of mandatory representation that forms an essential organizational and 
financial basis of economic an<;f social partnership .. 
22 There is greater willingness to resort to industrial action in "corporatist" states like Austria and Sweden among 
profe~sion_s with above-average skills and incomes, e.g. air traffic controllers, bank employees, certain groups 
of university graduates, etc. 
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As regards the surrounding macroeconomic circumstances affecting the Austrian economy, the trend 
towards intemationafization is a determining factor for the future of economic and social partnership. In 
this respect, Austria would face its greatest challenge in the wake of accession to the EC. The 
importance of macro-economic incomes poficy would then tend to increase as other alternative instru-
ments such as foreign-exchange and interest-rate policies would be available only on a very limited 
scale 23. Concurrently, the implemen~ation of such macroeconomic incomes policies would be more 
difficult, because many areas of economic policy which are currently influenced by the system of 
economic and social partnership would then have largely lost their significance (e.g. subsidies) or 
would have been delegated to supranational authorities (e.g. agricultural-market regulation). The more 
limited scope for social-partnership action would, however, mean fewer tradeoff s and fewer 
opportunities for enforcing interest-groµp discipfine and thus some loss of "contractual capacity." 
Even in the event that Austria does not become a member of EC, it has to be assu-med that the trend 
towards greater factor mobility will continue. In terms of labor, mobility may mean that there may be a 
drain of highly skilled tabor and an influx of less qualified labor (especially from Eastern Europe). This 
would create more diversified wage structures and complicate working out uniform trade-union 
strategies. The increasing liberalization of international capital flows and generally higher factor mobility 
of capital may produce a shift in economic power away from labor to capital, thus affecting the balance 
of power in the system of economic and social partnership. 
With economic structures, ideologies and philosophies changing worldwide, Austria will see a re-
evaluation of, and shift In, social-poficy objectives. ~rowth-orientation, the basic consensus, economic 
and social partnership is built on, is loosing ground. On the one hand, losses in income growth and a 
diversified economic development aggravate distribution issues. On the other, additional economic 
and social confficts are arising (e.g. ~nvironmental issues, women's issues, "new poverty" in the 
nonproduction-related sector) which exceed the terms of referen-ce of the system of economic and 
social partnership The political parties are therefore gaining ground in economic policy making as are 
the media and special-interest groups representing individual interests24. Another increasingly 
important factor in Austrian economic policy making is a judiciary branch taking a more active part in 
economc and social poficy. 
In tandem with these trends the need on the part of the economic interest groups to justify their 
existence towards their members ls growing, as the latter, due to social reforms, are better educated 
2
~ ~e ·hard currency-! a;>p~ach (fix_ed ~xchange rates between the schilling and the OM) practically implies 
al eac.y now non-use o mone,ary pol..-v instruments and reI· f · · · · · 
-, 1ance on a unctIomng economic and social pohcy. 
2~ A..'l a~er::p ~ eX1ending the economic and social partnershi · • • • · 
successful i there were a s"\ru": .. 1 organ·1Zed . Pinto an ace-partnership would only be 
r-
00 representallve body of • I • 1 · t t" · h h · d com;:,ara!:>le rne:r.!:>ershi;> s1ruc.ures, internal dis . r d ec_o _og1ca m eres wit compre ensIve an 
besides the exisfo-.g "producer organiza!ions· ~~r~n~ a~ thus, ba~ai~ing_ power and contractual capacity 
cen!•af.zed ·e-cobgcal interest group· (and thls ma • owever, no _indication of any such trend towards a 
have to oo so\1&d in the pot-tical and not in an ·exp~:dotd~ven ~I desirable) so that any conflicts in the area will 
e socia partnership forum 
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and informed and have highly diversified needs. This requires more commitment and flexibility on the 
part of the economic interest ·groups and a willingness to criticize and accept criticism in terms of 
internal decision-making, personnel skilling and remuneration, while the members' "traditional ties" 
and "automatic loyalty" to group-specific organizations (and parties) are diminishing - as is class 
consciousness, while individualism is increasing in every walk of life. 
------------- . - .. . - - ... ·- .... 
It is impossible to draw a uniform picture of the future development of economic and social partnership. 
Expectations are, however, that the clout of economic and social partnership as a specific conflict-
solving system, which takes a_c:count of macroeconomic and social criteria, will decrease as market-
oriented control mechanisms are gaining ground. Ihere is historical and international evidence that 
such a development may imply more social and regional disparity, while the impact on economic 
growth is not clearly predictable. 
At the same time, fundamental issues of macroeconomic coordination remain, in particular in terms of 
incomes policy. Economic and social partnership, which has evolved into an effective problem-solving 
mechanism in these areas, will stay in place as a macroeconomic control system in incomes policy. The 
system and its underlying concept of macroeconomic balance of power seem to rely on broad social 
...-~-·-.-- .. - .- .... ., .. •,-····-···-- ---.---,--.~··· -··· 
acceptance and legitimization_by the Austrian population25. 
'--·----------~-------.....,_-~------- --- ,. 
In addition to the "traditional" macroeconomic responsibilities of economic and social partnership, the 
system may be faced with new challenges in that the economic and social partnership and the interest 
groups involved will have to repre-sent Austrian economic interests as a whole - as an all-Austrian 
lobby - before the EC. Given the massive presence of interest groups and lobbies (particularly on the 
employers' side) at the European supranational organizations, there is the danger of power imbalance • . 
for the firms and (above all) for the workers of a small country, which can only be countervailed or at 
least mitigated by a concerted action. Rapid economic structural change will, at the same time, 
highlight the necessity of developing and/or intensifying socially acceptable mechanisms of coping 
with structural changes. The system of economic and social partnership is offering a multitude of long-
run possibilities for this task, e.g. in labor-market policy, education, foreign worker employment, with 
the social partners themselves and general political conditions shaping the future of the system. 
All considered, a partial dismantling of this Austrian "peculiarity" of economic and social policy making 
does not mean that specific historical, political and social facts of this country are going to lose their 
influence in economic policy making totally. From the perspective of the author the end of economic 
and social partnership in Austria is not near, but there will certainly be changes in the structures of the 
interest groups involved and in the emphasis areas of their activities towards intensified concentration 
25 A study conducted by the "Sozialwissenschaftlichen Studiengesellschaft" (Society for Social-Scien~e 
Studies) shows that, in June 1990, 63% of the respondents (1983:69%) considered the system of economic and 
social partnership to be "by and large an advantage for Austria.· Among Socialist voters, acceptance was 
highest (77%), followed by Conservative voters (69%); acceptance was lowest among Green voters (48%), 
Freedom Party voters (45%) and Communist voters (30%). 
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on "core areas" of economic and social policy and less involvement in general issues of social policy 
(and the political parties). Like every other social institution, the system of economic and social 
partnership is subject to new challenges and structural change. The functioning system of economic 
and social partnership is doubtless an international advantage for Austria; which will not only be 
maintained but expanded in light of the increasing internationalization of the economy. 
Are there any internationally valid les$ons to be learned from the experiences of the Austrian system 
of social partnership? As has been shown in this paper, there are, of course, many historical and 
institutional Austrian peculiarities that warn against any generalizations. On the other hand, the idea of 
a "social partnership" is gaining ground in discussions about future decision-making structures in the 
EC, has been advocated at the last congress of the British trade unions and is of special interest to the 
new democracies in Eastern Europe. Many of these countries (like Czechoslovakia and Hungary) have 
close traditional ties with Austria, are of comparable size and see themselves in a political and 
economic situation very similar to that of Austria in the 1950s, when the institutions of social 
partnership were developed. 
Especially from a democracy point of view this Eastern European discussion is of special interest when 
confronted with Austria's experiences. In many of these Eastern European countries we find a heated 
debate between advocates of an "Austrain" or "Swedish" variant of a corporatist approach and those 
who are gui-ded by a deep mistrusfagainst encompassing economic and social organizations (even 
under a democratic system) and aim at a "pure" market economy, "invisible-hand"-style.26 To this kind 
of discussion I would like to contribute two 'mains results from the Austrian experience: 
1) A policy that is based on J. K. Galbraith's (1967) concept of "countervailing powers" and on an 
"interventionist market economy" seems to be better able to combine economic growth, structural 
change and social stability than an "invisible-hand" approach. 
2) An interventionist model, as the system of social partnership, can only be successful if it is based on 
the voluntary cooperation of strong, encompassing social and economic organizations. This 
necessarily means powerstructures different from a democracy model that is based on a strict 
separation of politics and economics. In my view, such a "separation-model" is not realistic. The 
Austrian system of close, but open connections between politics and economics can be seen as 
more balanced and democratically controlled than the alternative of a political system heavily 
influenced by uncontrolled and single-issue-oriented special-interest groups and political action 
committees. On the other hand big, all-inclusive "social partnership organizations" necessarily 
mean creation and concentration of power. Therefore it is essential to see such a system of social 
partnership as a subsystem of a general concept of dividing political and economic powers, a 
26 In Czechoslovakia, leading figures of such a discussion are for instance Prof. Komarek and most of the 
oollaborators of the famous •Prognosis-Institute·, on the one hand, and finance minister and chairman of the 
liberal-conservative group, Vaclav Klaus, on the other hand. 
23 
subsystem characterized by concepts of checks and balances. As the Austrian experience shows, 
the distribution of powers within such a system is not stable but will have to change, according to 
the historical, social and economic developments of a country. The more ·open· and adaptable a 
system of social partnership proves itsett, the better it can perform both with regard to democratic 
standards and to economic and social efficiency. 
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